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Domestic Courts in International Law:
The International Judicial Function of
National Courts
ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS*
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS OR DOMESTIC COURTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Globalization has augmented the permeability of domestic legal
orders, while at the same time it has led to a considerable increase in
international regulation. It was only natural then that domestic courts
would be faced ever more frequently with having to apply rules
promulgated at the international level. This in turn has led to a
proliferation of studies and projects as to how domestic courts deal with
international law questions that arise, directly or incidentally, in the
course of domestic proceedings.1 No doubt this is a very important, if

* Lecturer in International Law, University College London and University of Glasgow
[a.tzanakopoulos@ucl.ac.uk]. This paper served as the background paper for one of the panels at
the symposium on “The International Judicial Function,” which took place in Amsterdam in
March 2011. It is an evolution of the paper presented at the 4th Biennial ESIL Conference in
Cambridge in September 2010 and published as Domestic Courts as the “Natural Judge” of
International Law: A Change in Physiognomy, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012), from
which it also draws in relevant parts. Many thanks are due to Lord Mance of the U.K. Supreme
Court, Professors David D. Caron, Christian J. Tams, Jean d’Aspremont, and George Pavlakos, as
well as to the participants in the Seminar on the International Judicial Function and in Agora 12
of the 4th Biennial ESIL Conference for their comments on earlier incarnations of this paper.
Further comments are invited and may be directed at the address above. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1. One could cite, by way of example, the study by SHAHEED FATIMA, USING
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS (2005; 2d ed. forthcoming 2012); the comparative
study INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS:
INCORPORATION,
TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUASION (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011); the collective work
CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (August
Reinisch ed., 2010); and the ACIL/OUP project and electronic database OXFORD REPORTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS, http://www.oxfordlawreports.com (last visited Apr.
23, 2012) [hereinafter ILDC]. These are only some of the most recent incarnations of the interest
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very comparative research-intensive question. Yet in this article, the
subject is not “international law in domestic courts,” but rather
“domestic courts in international law”; that is to say, this article seeks to
establish the position of domestic courts in the international legal order.
The question is then whether domestic courts are assigned an
international judicial function by international law, and whether they in
fact assume and exercise that function.
This necessarily leads to a consideration of what is an
“international judicial function.” While this is a question of
considerable complexity,2 the structure of the Project on International
Courts and Tribunals’ symposium on “The International Judicial
Function” can be employed as a guide to and a distillation of the main
aspects of that function.3 These are: the aspect of dispute resolution
and/or law enforcement and the aspect of law-interpretation
and/or -development. It should be clarified, however, that dispute
settlement and enforcement form one single aspect, as judicial dispute
settlement “is indeed a primary form of law enforcement.”4 Similarly,
law-interpretation and law-development are but points on a spectrum—
only a thin line separates interpretation from “amendment.”5 This thin
line is also notoriously difficult to pin down with any certainty.6 The
task of fact-finding can be seen as necessarily included in these two

on international law in domestic courts. Coming closer to the topic of this article is ANDRÉ
NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011).
2. For example, a whole doctoral thesis was recently devoted to analyzing how the ICJ
understands its international judicial function:
GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, JUDICIAL
CONSCIOUSNESS, JUDICIAL FUNCTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
(forthcoming 2012). The ICJ itself has devoted considerable attention to elaborating its “judicial
function,” particularly in the context of Advisory Opinions. Its judges have done this even more
so in their relevant separate and dissenting opinions.
3. See Cesare P.R. Romano, Introduction, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011)
(discussing the structure of the panels at the symposium).
4. Christian J. Tams, Enforcement, in MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS,
ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 391, 394 (Geir Ulfstein ed., 2007). Indeed it is instructive
to compare two contributions under the very same title (albeit once in German), by Robert
Jennings, The Judicial Enforcement of International Obligations, 47 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] (1987) 3 [hereinafter
Jennings, International Obligations], and by Rudolf Bernhardt, Die gerichtliche Durchsetzung
völkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen, 47 ZAÖRV 17 (1987) (Ger.). The former deals primarily with
enforcement of international judicial decisions, while the latter focuses on dispute settlement as
judicial law enforcement. See Part III.A, infra.
5. See Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 1974–75
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 277 [hereinafter Akehurst, Hierarchy of Sources].
6. Cf. Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public International Law and
European Community Law Before Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of
Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569, 584 (2003).
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fundamental aspects of the judicial function of a court, namely
settlement/enforcement and interpretation/development, as it is their
prerequisite.7 These two aspects constitute then the “core meaning” of
the judicial function, according to the “common understanding” shared
by international judicial institutions.8
The two aspects are inseparable from each other.9 The resolution of
a dispute and the enforcement of the law that will go with it cannot be
divorced from the interpretation and potential development of the law
being applied. Since every norm may be able to sustain a number of
possible interpretations, its application by the judge in the case before
her in effect leads to the authoritative selection of one of the possible
interpretations, making law for the specific case.10 As such, decisions of
courts are not simply declaratory of the law, but rather, on some microlevel at the very least,11 constitutive of it.12 They are thus means by

7. The task of fact-finding thus will not be treated separately. Domestic courts are
undoubtedly better equipped to be fact-finders than international courts, if for no other reason
than at least due to their power to compel production of evidence. See Yuval Shany, Toward a
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 919
(2005) [hereinafter Shany, General Margin].
8. Cf. The International Judicial Function: Discussion, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 4 (James Crawford &
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/25_anniversary/
Judicial_Function_discussion.pdf (comments of Yuval Shany).
9. For a brief consideration of the conflicting assumptions as to the “lawmaking” power of
the ICJ and a way to reconcile them, see Christian J. Tams & Antonios Tzanakopoulos,
Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
781, 782–86 (2010) [hereinafter Tams & Tzanakopoulos, Barcelona Traction]. The position of
other international courts could be seen as analogous, at least in their respective “field” of
international law or “sectoral regime.”
10. For an explicit recognition of this, see Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 17.6(ii), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Anti-Dumping Agreement].
11. For an expression of this, see Christopher G. Weeramantry, The Function of the
International Court of Justice in the Development of International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
309, 320 (1997).
12. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 242 et seq. (2d ed. 1960); cf. Iain G.M. Scobbie,
The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judicial Function, 8
EUR. J. INT’L L. 264, 273–74 (1997); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 100 (1933); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Decisions of Municipal
Courts as a Source of International Law, 1929 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 65, 85 (1929) [hereinafter
Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts].
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which the law is developed,13 and courts serve as the “agents” of that
development.14
That these two aspects are inseparable, and constitute the “core
meaning” of the international judicial function is supported by the
authority of two former Presidents of the ICJ, among other
commentators.15 Yet this authority does not refer to the international
judicial function specifically, but rather to the judicial function in
general. Indeed, is it not also the function of domestic courts to resolve
disputes and thus to enforce the law within their jurisdiction, which will
invariably serve to both clarify and develop the relevant law?
The two fundamental and inseparable aspects of the international
judicial function (for brevity, dispute resolution and law-development)
are then nothing but fundamental aspects of any judicial function (i.e.,
also of the domestic judicial function).16 Indeed, “the essential features
of the judicial settlement of disputes,” whether by domestic or by
international courts, “seem to be universally recognized,”17 and hand-inhand with judicial settlement goes the development of the law.
This brings up the question of what—if anything—separates the
international from the domestic judicial function. A very simple answer
would be to distinguish between courts established by international
13. Manfred Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of
Justice to the Development of International Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 241
(1983).
14. Tams & Tzanakopoulos, Barcelona Traction, supra note 9, at 785. See also THIRD
ILDC COLLOQUIUM ON DOMESTIC COURTS AS AGENTS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
http://www.ejiltalk.org/third-ildc-colloquium-on-domestic-courts-as-agents-of-legaldevelopment/ (articles on file with author, forthcoming 2012) (program available).
15. See Robert Y. Jennings, The Role of the International Court of Justice, 1997 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 41 (stating that the primary task of a court of justice is to dispose, in accordance with
the law, of the particular dispute between the particular parties before it, as well as the
development of the law, if only integral and incidental to the disposal of the issues before the
court). See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
583, 591–92 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins) (expressing an opinion similar to that
of Jennings).
16. See the consideration of (domestic) “judicial functions” in interpreting Article 2(1)(a) of
the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property in Rep. of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, 43d Sess., Apr. 29–July 19, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (Sept. 10, 1991),
reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991Add.1 (Part 2)
(stating that these functions comprise adjudication of litigation, dispute settlement, determination
of questions of law or fact, orders of provisional or enforcement measures, and other functions
related to a proceeding); cf. Gerhard Hafner & Ulrike Kohler, The United Nations Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 12 (2004); cf.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE
IMMUNITY AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ¶ 8 (1985).
17. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE
DOMESTIC COURTS 6 (1981).
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treaty (i.e., under international law), which exercise an international
judicial function, and those established under the law of a state, which
do not. This highly formalistic criterion for distinction would halt the
enquiry at a very early stage. More importantly, however, it leaves
certain issues unaddressed. There is no doubt that domestic courts apply
international law in a variety of cases, and with increasing regularity—
why should they then not be seen as exercising an international judicial
function? In the final analysis they are applying (international) law to
facts, thereby settling a dispute under (international) law, and further
contributing to the development of that law. Both fundamental aspects
of the (international) judicial function seem fulfilled in such a case.
Another seemingly simple answer, flowing from the previous
paragraph, would be one that focuses on the nature of the rules that the
relevant court applies (i.e., whether they are “international” or
“domestic”). Consequently, domestic courts could only ever be seen as
engaging in an international (as distinct from domestic) judicial function
when they deal with international, rather than domestic, norms.18 This
distinction is taken up in the following part, as it seems to furnish the
only meaningful criterion for telling apart the international from the
domestic judicial function.
II. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC NORMS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS
The basic argument in this part is that the distinction between
international and domestic norms has become increasingly blurred, and
that it is complicated by two related factors: the directionality of
international obligations undertaken by States (Part II.A); and the
variety in the methods of internalization or domestication of
international norms (Part II.B).
18. In that latter case, when acting to decide claims under international law, they would be
“doubling” as international (judicial) organs, thus undertaking an international judicial function.
See, e.g., Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence
of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 74–75 (2009); M. Shah Alam,
Enforcement of International Human Rights Law by Domestic Courts: A Theoretical and
Practical Study, 53 NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 399, 400 (2006); Schreuer, supra note 17, at 7;
RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER xi
(1964). This is along the lines of Scelle’s theory of dédoublement fonctionnel. GEORGES SCELLE,
II PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPES ET SYSTÉMATIQUE 10–12 (1934); see also generally
Yuval Shany, National Courts as International Actors: Jurisdictional Implications (Hebrew
Univ. Int’l Law Forum, Research Paper No. 22-08, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292056 [hereinafter Shany, Jurisdictional
Implications] (arguing that empirical evidence shows that national courts are more readily acting
like international courts and thus a more robust framework for coordinating domestic and
international legal procedures and judicial decisions is needed).
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A. The Directionality of International Obligations
Not only is there a proliferation of regulation taking place at the
international level, but also a great number of norms adopted at that
level is characterized by a distinct and peculiar “directionality.” Many
international norms are no longer traditional, almost exclusively
“extrovert” or “outward-looking” obligations imposed on States with
respect to their interaction with other States on the international plane.
Rather, most are increasingly “introvert” or “inward-looking” norms;19
that is to say, norms that aim to regulate State conduct within the
domestic jurisdiction (or, to put it another way, norms whose intended
operation is through—direct or indirect—implementation within the
domestic jurisdiction).20 Further, certain (“traditional”) norms regulating
State-to-State conduct on the international plane may also have an
“introvert” aspect: they may have the effect of creating rights for
individuals by requiring that certain conduct be taken within the
domestic jurisdiction.21 This highlights the difficulty in clearly
distinguishing between outward- and inward-looking norms,22 but it
does not stop one from considering whether a particular aspect of a
norm is outward- or inward-looking, depending on where and how it
seeks to produce its effects (i.e., horizontally [State-to-State] or
vertically [within the State]).
Inward-looking norms, or inward-looking aspects of norms, may
demand (i) that the State undertake, or refrain from, certain conduct
within its domestic jurisdiction; (ii) that certain limits be imposed on
previously unregulated State conduct within its jurisdiction; or (iii) that
the State prohibit, regulate, or permit certain conduct by natural persons
19. For the terminology and similar definitions, albeit in a slightly different context, see
Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 920.
20. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts as the “Natural Judge” of International
Law: A Change in Physiognomy, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 158 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts]; Jean d’Aspremont, The Systemic Integration of International
Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International
Legal Order, in THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS AND THE (DE-)
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 142 (Ole Kristian Fauchald and André
Nollkaemper eds., 2012) [hereinafter d’Aspremont, Domestic Judges as Architects].
21. For an example of such a norm, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1),
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 and the relevant jurisprudence of the ICJ in
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494, ¶ 77 (June 27); Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 35–36, ¶ 40 (Mar. 31). See also d’Aspremont,
Domestic Judges as Architects, supra note 20, at 142–43 with further references; David Sloss,
Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 6 (David Sloss ed., 2009).
22. Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 920–21.
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and legal entities within its jurisdiction. While few traditional
international norms could permeate the protective veil of domestic
jurisdiction, most prominently those dealing with immunity23 and with
the treatment of aliens, many modern international norms are of the
inward-looking type. A number of areas of international law, such as
international human rights law,24 international economic law,25
international investment law,26 international criminal law,27 international
humanitarian law,28 the international law of the sea,29 international

23. In his Report to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Gerhard Hafner, the
Chairman of the Working Group on the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, discussed the possible form of the outcome of the work on the topic, and reported
the views of delegations as to whether a convention or a model law would be preferable.
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Rep. of the Chairman of the
Working Group of the 6th Comm., 54th Sess., Nov. 8–9, 1999, ¶¶ 7–12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/
L.12 (Nov. 12, 1999). Commenting later on the adopted Convention, he reflected that in the view
of some delegations, a convention was preferable because only a binding instrument would allow
the generation of uniform state practice in an area of law where the rules were to be applied by
national courts. Hafner & Kohler, supra note 16, at 9. See also COE EXPLANATORY REPORTS ON
STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 16, ¶ 9 (implying that the Convention aims at “a harmonisation of
the laws of the member States of the Council of Europe”).
24. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS—BETWEEN IDEALISM AND
REALISM 110–12 (Marise Cremona et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
25. See, e.g., Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 10; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3.
26. See, e.g., the tension between a State’s regulatory powers and the explicit and implicit
limitations to these powers imposed by obligations not to expropriate or to accord “fair and
equitable treatment” customarily found in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in multilateral treaties
like the North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1105 and 1110, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) and the Energy Charter Treaty arts. 10(1) and 13, Dec. 17, 1994,
2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
27. International criminal law, especially as found in specific treaties, establishes obligations
on States to criminalize certain conduct within their jurisdictions and to prosecute such conduct.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents arts. 2–3, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages arts. 2–3, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings arts. 3–6, Dec. 15,
1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism arts. 4–8, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
28. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field arts. 49–54, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (“Geneva Convention I”);
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 50–52, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Geneva Convention II”);
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 129–31, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (“Geneva Convention III”); Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War arts. 146–48, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Geneva Convention
IV”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 85–87, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(“Additional Protocol I”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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environmental law,30 and the derivative (or secondary) law (droit
dérivé) of some international organizations, primarily the UN when
acting through the Security Council,31 are either exclusively made up of
such inward-looking norms, or contain them to a significant degree.
This has significant consequences for the implication of international
norms with an inward-looking aspect in proceedings before domestic
courts.
When inward-looking international norms, which in effect impose
obligations on the State to take certain conduct or measures within its
domestic jurisdiction, are looked at from within the State, the relevant
obligations appear to be placed primarily on the State Executive, since it
is the Executive who usually has both the legislative32 and the executive
initiative. Domestic courts have a reactive role in this connection: they
are called upon to check that the Executive is acting in compliance with
the law.33 This law will include international law requiring certain
conduct within the domestic jurisdiction.34 Further, individuals and
other entities may derive rights from the international obligations
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1, Jun. 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (“Additional Protocol II”).
29. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 94 (on State obligations
to legislate domestically in various matters regarding ships flying its flag on the high seas) and 98
(on the obligation to legislate regarding search and rescue on the high seas), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 396.
30. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic art. 9, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 (“OSPAR Convention”); Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters art. 3(1), June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (“Aarhus Convention”); Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 2–3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 148.
31. See, e.g., SC Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); SC Res 1988,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011); SC Res 1989, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1989 (June 17,
2011).
32. For an explicit recognition of the limitation imposed by international law (in casu jus
cogens and thus also outward-looking rules having that nature) on legislative initiative by the
Swiss authorities and subsequently also by the Swiss Constitution, see Erika de Wet, The
Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National
and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 97, 101–05 (2004).
33. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 78 (2007) (“The
historic role of the courts has . . . been to check excesses of the executive power . . .”).
34. For example, under U.K. law, if a public official is not bound to exercise discretion to
make a decision in accordance with an unincorporated treaty, but it is still open to her to do so,
U.K. courts may consider the unincorporated treaty in reviewing the decision. Lord Bingham of
Cornhill, International Law in National Courts, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 2–3 (James Crawford &
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/25_anniversary/Int_
Law_in_National_Courts_paper.pdf; see also Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Rule of Law, supra
note 33, at 81–82; TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 110 et seq. (2010).
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assumed by the State. From the perspective of these individuals and
entities, then, whether the right that has been violated by Executive
action stems from international or domestic law is irrelevant: they will
challenge it on any available legal basis.35 From the perspective of
domestic courts, in turn, entertaining the claim should be nothing
unusual: it is their proper role to police the actions of political branches
for compliance with the law.36
It is then ordinary for individuals to bring claims against the State
before domestic courts when they perceive that their rights have been
violated or that the Executive has acted illegally within the domestic
jurisdiction. Given that a vast array of international obligations
nowadays are of the inward-looking type, and given, further, that these
obligations cover almost all aspects of contemporary life, many of them
will fall to be considered by domestic courts.
Even outward-looking, or traditional State-to-State, rules are not
immune from being invoked by individuals before domestic courts in an
attempt to restrain Executive action,37 although this will usually refer to
action outwith the domestic jurisdiction and will be entertained by
domestic courts only with great difficulty.38 To take a few examples, in
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, the attempt was to enforce
the prohibition of the use of force (as in casu found to have been

35. It is instructive, for example, that individuals targeted by the regime imposed by the
Security Council under S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) and subsequent
relevant resolutions have challenged their designation under both domestic and international law,
many a time in one and the same complaint. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court
Reactions to UN Security Council Sanctions, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (August Reinisch ed., 2010) 54, 54–58 [hereinafter
Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court Reactions] with further references to case-law.
36. But see R (on the application of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister,
[2002] EWHC (Admin) 2777, ¶ 36 (Eng.) (“[T]he domestic courts are the surety for the lawful
exercise of public power only with regard to domestic law; they are not charged with policing the
United Kingdom’s conduct on the international plane. That is for the International Court of
Justice.”) (emphasis added) (note that the reference is to conduct on the international plane and
not under international law). See, however, supra note 34, as well as R v. Sec’y of State for
Home Dep’t ex parte Launder, [1997] UKHL 20; and R v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions ex parte
Kebeline, [1999] UKHL 43.
37. See, e.g., Charles C. Hyde, The Supreme Court of the United States as an Expositor of
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1937) (as early as 1937, Hyde was commenting that
a domestic court may “test the propriety of acts, embracing those of its own sovereign, by what it
conceives to be the requirements of international law”).
38. This is not necessarily the “fault” of the domestic court. “Political or legislative
departments may by appropriate acts legally and effectively frustrate the effort to obtain from a
local tribunal its own views on the question whether the requirements of international law have
been disregarded by the sovereign.” Id. (emphasis added). On these, and on “avoidance
techniques” invented by domestic courts themselves, see infra note 55.
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violated by the ICJ in Nicaragua) to constrain the actions of the U.S.
government.39 Even if the action failed in that instance, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals noted that “[s]uch basic norms of
international law (i.e., jus cogens norms) . . . may well have the
domestic legal effect that appellants suggest. That is they may well
restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains
it.”40 In R v. Jones (Margaret), the House of Lords had to consider
whether waging an aggressive war, prohibited by international law,
constituted a crime under English law and thus justified prima facie
criminal reaction on the part of citizens (trying to avert the commission
of the crime).41 In a similar case before the German courts, an army
officer refused to provide intelligence services in connection with the
2003 Iraq war because the war was allegedly in violation of
international law and had his sanction set aside by the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court).42
It appears then that domestic courts will naturally come to deal
with many disputes involving international law in view of the inwardlooking nature of many contemporary international norms. They will
not, however, necessarily explicitly acknowledge they are doing so, for
in a great many instances (and in a great many domestic legal systems)
the international norm will merely remain in the background. This is
due to the variety of methods of “internalization” of international norms
in different domestic legal systems, to which the next sub-part turns.
B. Variety in the Methods of Internalization of International Norms
There is great divergence and variety in the methods by which
domestic legal systems internalize rules of international law, whether
from treaty or custom, if they explicitly internalize them at all. Yet,
even when not explicitly internalized, international norms may still have
an impact on the domestic legal system.
In some domestic legal systems certain international rules are
immediately incorporated (e.g., customary norms en bloc in some
States; international human rights norms in other States; norms in

39. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 934–35
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. Id. at 941 (emphasis added).
41. R v. Jones (Margaret), [2006] UKHL 16.
42. See International Law in National Courts: Discussion, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 3 (James Crawford &
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/25th_anniversary/book.php
(comments of Professor Christian Tomuschat).

2011]

Domestic Courts in International Law

143

ratified international treaties in yet other States; any conceivable
mixture of those; and so forth) (incorporation); others may need to be
transformed or transposed through a domestic implementing act
(transformation). Beyond these methods of explicit internalization or
“domestication” of international law, there are more subtle ways in
which international norms operate in the domestic legal order. Even
when not incorporated or transposed, international norms may operate
domestically through the application of a presumption of conformity of
domestic law with international obligations incumbent on the State,
which then requires that domestic law be construed consistently with
international law if at all possible (consistent interpretation). Taking
this further still, even pre-existing domestic law may happen to
coincide, in substance, with international norms, and thus result in the
application of international law domestically in a more or less
“unconscious” manner (referred to in this article as “deeply
internationalized” or “consubstantial” norms; originally a theological
term, “consubstantiality” denotes that which is “regarded as identical in
substance or essence” with something else, “though different in
aspect”).43
Examples
of
such
“deeply
internationalized,”
or
“consubstantial”—if still domestic—rules could be constitutional rights
that in substance reflect internationally protected rights,44 or more
generally domestic rules that are in substance reflective of an existing
international rule, such as the rules of interpretation.45 Rules of
international law do not lose their original character and become rules
of domestic law by the mere fact of their domestication, or by the
parallel existence of a substantively identical, or even merely
significantly similar, domestic rule.46
43. CORMAC MCKEOWN & ANDREW HOLMES, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 367 (15th
ed. 2009). The Greek word is οµοούσιο (i.e., literally “that which has the same substance”).
44. Making a similar argument, if from the inverse, David Berry has contended that when
the Constitution can be interpreted to accord with an (unincorporated) international treaty, it can
be seen as a transforming document (i.e., as transforming the treaty into domestic law).
International Law in National Courts: Discussion, supra note 42, at 4 (comments of David
Berry). Similarly Armand De Mestral has argued that there are “many ways to incorporate
international treaty obligations beyond the explicit statement of obligations in statutory form.” Id.
at 4–5 (comments of Professor Armand De Mestral). From the perspective of international law
then, applying a constitutional norm that has the same content as an international norm can be
seen as application of international law.
45. Lord Bingham notes, in this connection, that there is “very little difference between the
approach of domestic courts to interpretation and that laid down in the [1969] Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.” International Law in National Courts, supra note 34, at 3.
46. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 77. Cf. id. at 92 (“For one who chooses
to confine himself to the field of municipal law, judges administer in all these cases the law of

144

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:133

C. Substance over Form
Because of the great divergence in domestic legal systems as to the
reception of international law, and because of the various ways in which
international norms, particularly of the inward-looking type, operate
within these domestic legal systems, a clear distinction between
international and domestic norms is not possible in a great number of
cases. When a domestic court for example applies domestic law giving
effect to an international obligation,47 or when it applies domestic law
that in substance reflects an international norm, or when it uses
international law to interpret domestic law in conformity with the
former, what kind of law is the domestic court really applying? While
formally it may be a domestic norm, in substance it will be an
international one.
It is then not possible to decide whether a domestic court is
exercising an international or a domestic judicial function based simply
on the character or nature of the norms applied as “national” or
“international.” One would have to look more closely at the two basic
aspects of the judicial function exercised by domestic courts, and see to
what extent these refer to international law and international disputes.
Yet, it would be useful to note, even at this relatively early stage of the
inquiry, that from the perspective of international law, it does not really
matter what law the domestic court purports to be applying. What
matters is whether international law is complied with.48 This will be of
crucial importance in the subsequent discussion.
their own country, and nothing else. But one who looks at the substance of things rather than at
their form must realize that when acting in that capacity municipal judges are the organs of the
international legal community.”) (emphasis added).
47. For an example of this, see Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 12–13.
48. An explicit example of this approach is furnished by the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) system. Under Article 1 of the ECHR, the parties must “secure”
Convention rights to persons under their jurisdiction; yet this requires neither incorporation, nor
transformation, nor for that matter mere reference to the Convention. All that is required is that
domestic law and practice do not result in violation of Convention rights (i.e., it is the substantive
outcome that matters). See, e.g., Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, App. No. 5614/72,
¶ 50 (1976); James and others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79 ¶ 84 (1986); Observer and
Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, ¶ 76 (1991). By way of corroboration and
extension of this point, consider the following statement:
Whether in the human rights field or otherwise, the United Kingdom does not lightly
become a party to a treaty . . . it will . . . want to be satisfied that its domestic law and
its international obligations are in harmony. Sometimes it will be necessary to amend
legislation to that end.
Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of International Human
Rights: The United Kingdom, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC
COURTS 37, 37 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) (emphasis added).
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III. DOMESTIC COURTS AS INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLERS AND LAW
ENFORCERS
A. Dispute Settlement as Law Enforcement
If a judgment can be seen as settling a dispute, it is open to the
challenge that it does not actually enforce the law. It may declare the
law on a given matter, but that law still remains to be enforced. This
notion of enforcement of law is inspired by the domestic law fascination
with enforcement through coercive measures imposed by some
centralized authority. In this sense, enforcement in international law—
unlike
dispute
settlement—has
only
exceptionally
been
institutionalized.49 Instead, the international legal system has always
relied on domestic courts as agencies of enforcement.50 But it is not with
this stricto sensu enforcement that one is concerned here. Rather, the
focus is on the lato sensu enforcement of law that the handing down of
any judicial decision constitutes, even if said decision is merely
declaratory in character.
49. The Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter could be mentioned as
one of the few relevant examples of institutionalization of enforcement in international law, but
even in this instance it could be argued that the Council was established to keep the peace rather
than enforce the law (paraphrasing Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J.
16, 294, ¶ 115 (June 21)); cf. Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to the
Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 15, 48–50 (2003). For the argument
that keeping the peace in the case of the Council is the same as enforcing the law, in the sense that
a threat to the peace constitutes a breach of an international obligation, see ANTONIOS
TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL—COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST
WRONGFUL SANCTIONS 78–79 (2011) [hereinafter TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE
SECURITY COUNCIL].
50. An obvious example, in the strict sense of enforcing an international decision, is the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards in the area of international
commercial and investment arbitration. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, and
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 54, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
There have also been attempts to enforce ICJ judgments through domestic court decisions, which
were found to be justiciable in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Reagan, 859 F.2d. at 934–35 (holding the
attempt at enforcement to be justiciable, even if it ultimately came to nothing for having failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted). Another example of the problems that attempts
to enforce international judicial decisions through national courts are faced with is furnished by
“Socobel” v. the Greek State, Apr. 30, 1951, 18 I.L.R. 3 (1951) (the Belgian court refused
enforcement of a Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) decision between Belgium and
Greece, inter alia, for lack of an exequatur of the decision in Belgium (i.e., it treated the PCIJ
decision as a foreign award). For comment, see E.K. NANTWI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
143–45 (1966).
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First of all, many a time a declaratory judgment is all the
“enforcement” that States seek in international law. Gray notes the new
importance that declaratory judgments have taken in the practice of the
ICJ, when compared for example with that of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), and highlights that States seem satisfied
with a declaratory judgment when they could have sought an award of
compensation.51 Similarly, a domestic decision bearing on the
interpretation or application of an international norm, even if simply
declaratory, can be seen as a form of enforcement of international law.
Much more importantly, however, there are decisions of domestic
courts, whether declaratory or constitutive, that—in settling a dispute
(e.g., between the Executive and an individual)—can be seen as stricto
sensu enforcing international law. The example would be when a
domestic court strikes down or disapplies legislation, or executive acts,
or even decisions of lower courts that are in violation of international
law. In such a case, the court is resolving a dispute between the parties
before it (in part at least as to the meaning of an international norm) and
in that it enforces the international norm, thereby avoiding the breach
and the concomitant engagement of the international responsibility of
the State. More pertinently still, a domestic court can address a violation
of international law by the State of which it is an organ ex post facto,
thereby offering “juridical restitution” (i.e., the reversal of a juridical act
in breach of international law).52 In extreme cases, domestic courts
could even be considered as applying countermeasures against another
State—the enforcement mechanism par excellence of international
law.53

51. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–100 (1990).
52. See Commentary on the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., 63–67, Apr. 23–June 1, July 10–
Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001]
2(II) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, 97, ¶ 5 U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter
ASR and Commentary].
53. For the argument, see TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra
note 49, at 126–28, 194–97. Note that in the oral pleadings in Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Verbatim Record, ¶ 14, (Sept. 12, 2011, 10 a.m.),
Christian Tomuschat, pleading for Germany, rejects the argument that Italian court decisions
denying Germany’s sovereign immunity can be qualified as countermeasures, but not in
principle; rather he rejects the argument solely because the substantive and procedural
requirements for resorting to countermeasures are not met in casu:
[I]t would be outright absurd to argue that the jurisdiction of the Italian courts may be
justified as a countermeasure responding to Germany’s failure to fulfill its duty of reparation. There is no such failure, and for more than 40 years, from the conclusion of the
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With this in mind, it becomes clear that all inward-looking
international norms depend on domestic organs, and in the last instance
domestic courts, for their enforcement.54 A prime example here are
international human rights norms, but also norms of international
criminal law, the international law of the sea (e.g., with respect to
prompt release of vessels), international investment law, as well as all
other areas of international law where inward-looking norms are
preponderant (see Part II.A above). Further, an argument could be made
that domestic courts are in fact enforcing international norms even when
they do not (explicitly) refer to international law. This would be the case
when they apply a domestic norm adopted to give effect to an
international obligation; when they interpret a domestic norm in
harmony with an international obligation; or even when they enforce a
“deeply internationalized” (or “consubstantial”) domestic rule (i.e., a
domestic rule that has a parallel existence in international law) (see Part
II.B above).
B. Settlement v. Creation of Disputes—Enforcement v. Violation of the
Law
It should be mentioned at the outset that domestic courts have a
seemingly very limited role—if they have one at all—in the settlement
of traditional State-to-State disputes. First of all, domestic courts
themselves have devised a number of “avoidance techniques” so as not
to have to adjudicate matters of “international relations,” which they
have traditionally viewed as more properly within the ambit of the
Executive.55 After all, the Executive is in almost all domestic legal
systems the branch entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs.56 Yet,

two compensation treaties of 1961 until the culmination of the Ferrini case, Italy never
made any representation to Germany in that sense.
But see the clearly different position of Andrea Gattini, also pleading for Germany, id. ¶ 33 (“. . .
it is not the business of domestic courts to decide and enforce countermeasures against a foreign
State.”) Gattini does not offer any justification for this position.
54. Cf. Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that “considerable and
important parts of international law have long been applied and enforced by domestic courts—but
to individuals and corporations . . . not to sovereign States”).
55. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159 (1993)
(addressing avoidance techniques adopted by national courts when dealing with international
norms); see generally also AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE
NATIONAL COURTS 391 (2000) (summarizing the discussion of the same or similar devices being
used by courts to avoid review of acts of international organizations).
56. See draft article 9(3) as proposed by Special Rapporteur G.G. Fitzmaurice, First Report
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (Mar. 14, 1956), reprinted in [1956] II Y.B. Int’l
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if anything, even when domestic courts do engage with such disputes, it
could be argued that their role is to create them, rather than to resolve
them. If the domestic court of State A resolves a dispute between “its
own” State and State B, the expectation would be that State B will
protest, and the dispute between the two states will “mature.” Domestic
courts being the organs of a State, their actions are attributable to that
State, and since they may well be in breach of international obligations
incumbent upon the State, these actions will engage the State’s
international responsibility.57 Examples would include anything from a
denial of sovereign immunity, to the decision not to apply a treaty
provision for lack of reciprocity in the application of the provision by
the other State.
On the other hand, if one were to cast the net very widely, with an
eye to the “directionality” of international norms mentioned in Part II
above, one would qualify as “international” disputes all disputes before
a domestic court that implicate an international norm.58 If this is
“casting the net widely,” it is not really contentious. Surely prize courts
have been seen traditionally as exercising a truly international judicial
function in this respect, being “free judicial agencies impartially
administering international law”59 in disputes relating to the seizure and
condemnation of ships, including merchant ships, and their cargo, in
accordance with the international law of armed conflict.60 If prize courts

L. Comm’n 104, 109, and commentary at 118–19 (giving an example of the primary role reserved
to the executive branch).
57. See ASR and Commentary art. 4, supra note 52, at 40–41, ¶ 6; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J., at
508, ¶¶ 114–15; Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Republik Österreich, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239; see
generally CONSTANTIN TH. EUSTATHIADÈS, 1 LA RESPONSIBILITÉ INTERNATIONALE DE L’ÉTAT
POUR LES ACTES DES ORGANES JUDICIAIRES (1936) (giving an early iteration of this principle).
58. Extrapolating from Bernhardt, supra note 4, at 24, it is arguable that an international
dispute exists when individuals or legal entities bring a claim against their own or another State,
when that claim is “framed” (umschrieben) by international law (e.g., when it is made under a
human rights treaty, or other treaty granting rights to individuals and legal entities, or under
customary international law).
59. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 65.
60. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA, ¶ 116 (1994), reprinted in SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); DEP’T OF THE
NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 7.10 (2007);
CANADA OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS:
JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL ¶ 870 (2001);
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN
KONFLIKTEN: HANDBUCH ¶¶ 1144–46 (1992).
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are not exactly a common occurrence these days,61 they do serve to
demonstrate that domestic courts exercise an international judicial
function when deciding a dispute by “administering” international law.
It is no longer the case that international law “regulates only the
relations between States” so that “the proper and normal occasion for
the judicial application of rules of international law is the existence of
disputes between States.”62 The need to consider and apply international
law should be deemed sufficient to characterize a dispute before a
domestic court as an “international” dispute.
As discussed in Part II.B above, however, it is rather difficult to
determine whether an international norm is at bar. The international
norm being “administered” by the domestic court may have been
internalized through incorporation, transformation, adoption of relevant
legislation in compliance with the international norm, or may not have
been explicitly internalized at all; but it may still operate through a
presumption for the interpretation of domestic law in harmony with
international obligations of the State (“consistent interpretation”), or
through pre-existing “consubstantial” domestic law. In cases where
individuals or legal entities within the domestic jurisdiction of a State
bring a case in domestic court against the State for violation of its
obligations or limits to its discretion, as these have been imposed, in the
final analysis, by international—if inward-looking (aspects of)—norms,
the domestic court will be engaged in the settlement of a dispute under
international law (i.e., a dispute whose subject-matter is regulated by
international law), and, in that, in the settlement of an international
dispute, even if it claims to be applying only domestic law. This is
either because the source of the domestic norm will be in international
law, or because the two will be “consubstantial.”
However, even in such a situation it may still very well be that the
domestic court is in fact creating, rather than settling, the international
dispute (or it is allowing it to “mature”); it is violating rather than
enforcing international law. This would be the case if the domestic court
misinterprets, misapplies, or disregards the international norm. The
court would thereby engage the State’s international responsibility, and
invite claims against it by other States, or, as the case may be, by other
beneficiaries of the international norm that are given standing under
international law to bring a claim in the particular instance (e.g.,
61. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 366
Mn. 13.89 (2004) (noting at footnote 103 that the U.K. “has not used prize courts for many years
and is unlikely to do so in the future”).
62. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 73.
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individuals protected under international human rights law, or investors
protected under international investment law). It would appear then that
the role of domestic courts as settlers of international disputes and
enforcers of international law is limited only to when it can be argued
that they applied international law correctly: only then will an
international dispute have been settled and international law enforced.
But who decides whether international law was correctly applied by the
domestic court? Who decides if the domestic court has enforced, rather
than violated, international law?
C. Who Decides? Domestic Courts as the “Natural” Judges of
International Law
In the decentralized international legal system, there is no final
arbiter of legality other than States themselves. As the addressees of
international norms, States interpret and apply them in the first
instance,63 thereby being the prima facie arbiters of legality of their
own—and anyone else’s—conduct.64 If this power of auto-interpretation
and application of international law sounds ominous, that is probably
because it is rather ominous. But States always interpret and apply
international law at their own risk:65 it is possible that their
interpretation and application will be challenged, and will be found
lacking before an international court, or in the context of some other
procedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In
international law then, authoritative interpretation and the final

63. See Georges Abi-Saab, “Interprétation” et “Auto-Interprétation”—Quelques réflexions
sur leur rôle dans la formation et la résolution du différend international, in RECHT ZWISCHEN
UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG—FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 9, 14–15 (Ulrich
Beyerlin ed., 1995); see generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93
(2003) (providing that “norms of international law are seldom ‘finished products’, simply
requiring implementation”).
64. See Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America
and France (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443, ¶ 81 (1978) (providing that “each State establishes
for itself its legal situation vis-à-vis other States”); Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12
R.I.A.A. 281, 310, ¶ 16 (1957) (providing that “il appartient à chaque État d’apprécier,
raisonnablement et de bonne foi, les situations et les règles qui le mettent en cause”); United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 28, ¶ 53 (May 24);
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 26 (May 28) [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Convention];
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, 134, ¶ 268 (June 27) . See also KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE, supra note 12, at 324.
65. Cf. James Crawford, Countermeasures as Interim Measures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 65, 66
(1994); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 459, 471
(2006).
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settlement of a dispute can only come from a centrally instituted thirdparty instance,66 or through agreement between the States-parties to the
rule or the dispute.67 All exercises of the power of auto-interpretation by
States unilaterally are then subject to this proviso: that they are not
authoritative or final, but they are at the acting State’s own risk.
For lack of a third-party instance or an agreement, however, the
first instance exercise of the power of auto-interpretation also becomes,
de facto, the last. This means that States, and courts as their organs, are
the natural judges of international law (i.e., the immediate judges, the
ones who will interpret and apply international law when no centrally
instituted judge exists).68 And while the auto-interpretation and
application of the law by the Executive is usually merely implicit in the
actions that it takes, domestic courts are the ones who will be called
upon to consider the conformity of State conduct with international law,
precisely because of the abundance of inward-looking rules. The nature
of these rules necessitates that in the last instance, looked at from within
the State, executive or legislative action will be challenged before the
domestic court, often by reference to an international inward-looking
rule, even if that rule has been (explicitly or implicitly) domesticated—
as described in Part II above.

66. It is for this reason, not merely because of the lack of a centralized legislator, that judges
in international law play allegedly “a far more important role” than at the domestic level. Cf. The
International Judicial Function: Discussion, supra note 8, at 4 (comments by Professor Alain
Pellet). Cf. also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 159 (1958). See J. L. Brierly, Sanctions, 17 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS
SOC’Y 67, 70–71 (1932). See also Peter Malanczuk, Zur Repressalie im Entwurf der International
Law Commission zur Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 45 ZAÖRV 293, 296 (1985). Cf. Appellate Body
Report, Canada—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶ 371,
WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008). In the law of treaties, it has been noted that the only alternative
to an agreement of the parties (as to the existence of the invalidity of a treaty or to the bringing
about its termination or suspension) is the “sentence d’un juge international.” Francesco Capotori,
L’extinction et la suspension des traités, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS 417, 564 (1971). Cf. Antonios
Tzanakopoulos, Article 67 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 1546, 1551–55, ¶¶ 11–21, in particular at 1554–55, ¶¶ 17, 20 (Olivier
Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
67. This is in line with the “established principle” enunciated by the PCIJ that a rule can
only be authoritatively interpreted by the one who can amend or repeal it. Question of Jaworzina
(Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 37 (Dec. 6).
See also HANS KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 174–75 (1925).
68. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Draught of a Code for the Organization of the Judicial
Establishment in France, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 296–97 (1843) (commenting
on Title V, § 1, arts. I–III). The term “natural judge” seems to have been employed in this sense
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Librairie Hachette v. Société Coopérative, 72 INT. L. REP. 78,
80–81 (1987). See also Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts, supra note 20, at 156–57.
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As organs of the State, courts have a mandate to interpret and
apply these international rules. That mandate is granted to them by
virtue of international law, quite apart from potential domestic
constitutional provisions to similar or even converse effect. Admittedly,
international law imposes international obligations on the unitary State,
of which courts are merely organs. But international law assigns to
domestic courts a position more important to that of the Executive or
the Legislature in the implementation of the State’s international
obligations. It establishes them as the “natural judges” of international
law, at one and the same time the point of first contact and the last line
of defense, the last opportunity for the State to comply with its
international obligations.
A number of arguments can be invoked to support the assertion
that international law establishes domestic courts as the natural judges
of international law. An “important principle of customary law”69
requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a claim that an (inwardlooking)70 international norm has been violated is made admissible on
the international plane.71 In this rule, international law acknowledges the
international judicial function of domestic courts as dispute-settlers and
law-enforcers, and reserves a mere subsidiary monitoring function for
the international instance. The domestic court is given the opportunity
to successfully deal with the essence of the international claim,72 by
correctly applying (but only in substance, not necessarily explicitly)
international law.73
The subsidiary role of international courts in comparison to the
primary role reserved for their domestic counterparts is made explicit in
international criminal law, namely in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.74 Further, the important role of domestic

69. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. [ELSI] (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42, ¶ 50 (July 20).
70. The relationship between inward-looking rules and the local remedies rule is evident in
that the rule does not apply in cases where the breach took place outside the jurisdiction of the
state. Cf. Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the
Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
5–6 (2003) with further references.
71. See further commentary to art. 44(b) ASR and Commentary, supra note 52, at 121, ¶ 3
(noting that the local remedies rule applies to claims that are not necessarily limited to the field of
diplomatic protection).
72. Cf. ELSI, supra note 69, at 46, ¶ 59; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, supra note
21, at 35–36, ¶ 40.
73. Cf. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 40–41 (July 6)
(separate opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht).
74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
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courts in the enforcement of international criminal law is highlighted in
the international obligations to extradite or prosecute offenders included
in various treaties, and possibly existing under general international
law.75 In this latter case the domestic court is in fact the only judicial
body that will administer international law with respect to the
international crime.
In the field of human rights, as well as in many other fields of
international law, the gradual acceptance of a margin of appreciation in
favor of domestic authorities, including domestic courts, points in the
same direction of subsidiarity between national and international
courts.76 In international economic law there is even explicit reference to
a similar concept: Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
provides, for example, that “[w]here the panel finds that a relevant
provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the [domestic] authorities’ measure
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations.”77 Even in the field of international
investment law the international judicial function of the domestic court
is retained unless explicitly contracted out of in favor of an international
instance.78 Then again, in many agreements it is potentially retained
through “fork in the road” provisions.
Finally, even State Executives have themselves used their State’s
domestic courts as the final opportunity to comply with international
obligations.79
But the question remains: who decides authoritatively, with
binding force, whether the domestic court has—in any given case—
lived up to the expectation of being the “natural judge” of international
law? Who decides whether in the instance the domestic court settled the
dispute/enforced the law or rather created a dispute by not enforcing the
law? The answer would have to be: States themselves do, either in the
75. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT
JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Zdzislaw
Galicki, Preliminary Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (“aut dedere aut
judicare”), Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/571 (June 7, 2006). The International Law Commission’s (ILC) work on the topic is
still ongoing.
76. See Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 926–31.
77. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 10, art. 17.6(ii) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 50, art. 25(1).
79. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) (the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledging the legal interest of the State to intervene in
judicial proceedings between private parties, and even appeal the decision of a lower court, where
that decision would result in a breach of U.S. international obligations).
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traditional decentralized manner (lack of protest/acquiescence)80 or
through the introduction of a third-party instance at the international
level to “supervise” the domestic court.
This, in turn, points to domestic courts being integrated in the
system of international dispute settlement. Domestic courts are
instituted as the last instance within the State that can uphold
international law and in that way avoid its violation by the State and the
concomitant engagement of the State’s international responsibility.
Domestic courts, however, are also subject to the supervision of States
as the “lawmaking” organ of international law, which in the instance
perform a “corrective function” akin to that performed by the
Legislature in response to court decisions in some domestic legal orders,
and of the international courts that these States institute. What remains
to be seen is whether the consideration of domestic courts as lawinterpreters and -developers yields the same answers to the same
questions.
IV. DOMESTIC COURTS AS INTERNATIONAL LAW-INTERPRETERS
AND -DEVELOPERS
If international law assigns domestic courts an international
judicial function in the settlement of disputes and law enforcement,
what does this mean for the courts’ potential role in developing
international law? It has already been argued that the settlement of
disputes and the concomitant enforcement of the law in any particular
instance cannot be separated from the interpretation and further
development of the law, which are both points on a spectrum.81 To the
extent that domestic courts undertake an international judicial function
in settling lato sensu international disputes and thus enforcing
international law, they will also help to develop international law.
Justice Cardozo embraced the international law-development function
of domestic courts when he stated that international law “has at times,
like the common law within States, a twilight existence . . . till at length
the imprimatur of a [domestic] court attests its jural quality.”82
Attesting the “jural quality” of a rule in heretofore “twilight existence”
is not all that different from constituting the rule, thereby developing
existing law.

80. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 39 (1974–75).
81. See text at supra, note 5.
82. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934) (emphasis added).
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A. Domestic Courts as State Organs
It is a trite observation that domestic courts, as State organs,
produce State practice and utter opinio juris, and are therefore capable
of creating or contributing to the creation of customary norms.83
Domestic courts are at the same time law-appliers and law-creators, and
officially so. And if one reminds us that from the perspective of
international law domestic court decisions are merely facts,84 we can
quickly retort that in international law ex factis jus oritur. Because of
the decentralized method of production of international law, whole
areas of it have been almost exclusively developed through the
jurisprudence of domestic courts. The laws of jurisdiction and of
immunity from jurisdiction can be invoked as convenient cases in
point.85 Both the International Law Commission86 and the ICJ87 have
recognized the potential of domestic courts for further developing the
law of immunity through their practice. But the crucial question—as
with any instance of State conduct capable of contributing towards lawcreation—is how to determine whether domestic court practice violates
international law rather than correctly interpreting it and thus
contributing to its development.
B. Consistent Interpretation
Before we proceed to discuss the distinction between violation and
development of international law on the part of domestic courts, it is
necessary to devote some brief comments to the courts’ interpretative
function. Domestic courts necessarily engage in interpreting
international law directly when they are faced with applying an
international norm. This will be the case, for example, when a state’s
domestic law incorporates international law through a constitutional

83. See Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 80 et seq.
84. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19
(May 25).
85. See Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 12.
86. See, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property: Information
and Materials Submitted by Governments, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 33rd Sess., May 4–
July 24, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/343, at 17, ¶ 1 (Apr. 14, 1981), where the UN Legal Counsel,
pursuant to the request of the ILC, which had just taken up the subject of jurisdictional
immunities of States, requests UN Member States to submit relevant material “including . . .
decisions of national tribunals.” For the importance given to domestic court decisions, and
judicial practice generally in this context, a cursory look at the questions addressed to Member
States in the document cited would suffice.
87. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
24, ¶ 58 (Feb. 14, 2002).
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provision or as common law.88 But domestic courts will also interpret
and apply international law when they engage in the interpretation and
application of a domestic implementing act. Many rules of international
law, particularly inward-looking norms, require the State to take action
to implement them in the domestic jurisdiction.89 In claims before
domestic courts, it will be the immediate or proximate source of
regulation that is usually invoked (domestic implementing act), rather
than the more remote one (international norm).
In those latter cases, and especially when the international norm
does not leave any margin of appreciation, or any room for discretion,
to the domestic implementing authorities, interpretation of the
proximate (domestic) act will at one and the same time constitute an
interpretation of the more remote one (the international norm). Courts
may take cognizance of that and even have recourse to the international
norm in order to decide on the interpretation or application (or even
validity) of the domestic act.90 Yet they may also ignore the existence of
the international norm and proceed with the interpretation only of the
domestic act invoked. Further, even if they do acknowledge the
international norm as the source of the domestic regulation, they may

88. Examples include the United States, where treaties of the U.S. are treated as “law of the
land,” see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; and the United Kingdom, where international customary law
is considered as law of the land (though the situation is much more complicated than this
statement might suggest), see International Law in National Courts: Discussion, supra note 42,
at 5 (comments of Roger O’Keefe). Many continental European States, such as Germany,
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law],
May 23, 1949, BGBl. 25, and Greece, 2008 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 28(1), also
incorporate rules of international law, whether customary or stemming from treaties to which they
have become parties, respectively.
89. To take but one example, the implementation of binding Security Council Resolutions
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires in most States the adoption of domestic
implementing acts, whether legislation or executive/administrative action. See generally Vera
Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).
90. See, e.g., the case of the Al-Haramain Foundation before Dutch courts, reported in U.N.
Chairman of the S.C. Comm., Letter dated Mar. 8, 2006 from the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the
Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/154, at 46, ¶¶ 8–9 (Mar. 10, 2006); cf. R (on the application of M) v.
HM’s Treasury, [2008] UKHL 26; and Case C-340/08, The Queen, M and Others v. Her
Majesty’s Treasury, 2010 E.C.R. I-3913. These cases refer to the interpretation of domestic
implementing acts and legislation with respect to the sanctions regime established by the Security
Council under Resolutions 1267 (1999) et seq. The relevant courts have direct recourse to the
international norm in order to interpret the domestic act.
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proceed to interpret both of them in a questionable manner,91 risking
breach of the international obligations of the State. On the other hand,
such questionable interpretation may impact the interpretation of the
international norm by other courts or by its creators, or even lead the
creators of the international norm to amend it.92
Finally, and most importantly, interpretation (and thus clarification
and development) of international law may take place in cases where
the domestic court applies exclusively domestic law but finds that it
must interpret it in such a way so as not to conflict with international
obligations incumbent upon the State. In such cases, interpretation of
the international norm and its requirements is necessary, as it is this
interpretation that will inform the interpretation of the (potentially
unrelated) domestic norms. This principle of “consistent interpretation”
is to be found in the law or judicial practice of many States, and
highlights how the relevant domestic courts exercise an international
judicial function even when not at all engaged in the direct application
of international law.93
91. For example in Bosphorus Hava v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications,
and the Attorney General, [1994] ILRM 551, 557–58, the Irish High Court acknowledged the
connection between a domestic regulation and a Security Council Resolution but proceeded to
interpret both norms contrary to the interpretation that had been offered by the Security Council,
the creator of the international norm in the instance. See also Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court
Reactions, supra note 35, for further examples.
92. This is, for example, what happened in R (on the application of Othman) v. Sec’y of
State for Work and Pensions, [2001] EWHC (Admin) 1022, ¶ 57, where the judge “read into” a
Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions some exceptions in order to safeguard a
sanctioned individual’s right to life and health. A year later the Security Council had adopted
similar exceptions for humanitarian reasons. See S.C. Res. 1452, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002). For a further example in an unrelated field of international law see
Part IV.C infra.
93. For reasons of space, only a brief overview will be given here. The locus classicus of
“consistent interpretation” is the U.S. Supreme Court’s “Charming Betsy” principle. See Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); see also MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S.
416, 434 (1913). In Germany, the rule of consistent interpretation is seen as flowing from the
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the Basic Law, and has been reiterated by the Federal Constitutional
Court. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 26, 1987, 74
BVerfGE 358, at 370; see also, e.g., Bruno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the
Enforcement of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS 71, 94–96 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997). In
Switzerland, the principle of consistent interpretation is called “Schubert-Praxis” and flows from
the relevant practice of the Federal Supreme Court. See de Wet, supra note 32, at 104 & n.37. A
principle of consistent interpretation exists in Australia, as enunciated by the High Court. See
Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia, 118 INT. L. REP. 371, 374, 377–79 (2001); see also The
International Judicial Function: Discussion, supra note 8, at 3 (comments of Melissa Perry). In
New Zealand there exists a very strong presumption of conformity with international law. See
Philip Sales & Joanne Clement, International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing
Framework, 124 L. Q. REV. 388, 393–94 (2008) (U.K.); see also International Law in National
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What is more, it could be said that domestic courts even interpret
international norms when they engage in interpretation of a
“consubstantial,” if formally unrelated, domestic norm.94 For example,
some domestic courts consider international law as informing the
interpretation of their Constitution.95 Even when they do not, the
interpretation of a domestic norm that is in substance similar or identical
to an international norm is bound to have repercussions as an instance
of State practice. In all these cases, again, the question is how to
distinguish between proper “interpretation” (and development) and
violation of international law: domestic court interpretations may not
accord with the (alleged) position under international law. It is to this
issue that we must now turn.
C. Violation or Development?
Domestic courts undertake an international law-developing
function even when they are ostensibly violating international law. At
the outset it should be noted that violation of the law always has in it the
seeds for future development, or change, of the law. Who, for example,
Courts: Discussion, supra note 44, at 5 (comments by Sir Kenneth Keith). Canada also has a
principle of consistent interpretation both with respect to treaty obligations and obligations under
international law. See Bouzari and others v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (2004) 71 O.R. 3d 675,
¶¶ 64–66 (Can. Ont. C.A.). As does Canada, so does, arguably, South Africa. See Azanian
People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671
(CC) at 25, ¶ 26 (S. Afr.). Italian courts engage in a rather peculiar construction with results
similar to those of adopting a principle of consistent interpretation: they consider international
law rules as special norms that are not superseded by later (domestic) general norms. See
Benedetto Conforti, National Courts and the International Law of Human Rights, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 3, 11–12 (Benedetto Conforti &
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997). The Polish Constitution provides in Article 91 that if domestic
statutes cannot be reconciled with international treaties ratified with prior parliamentary consent,
the international treaty shall prevail over the domestic statute. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ
POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 91 (Pol.). As for the United Kingdom, there
is (a) a presumption of compatibility in the common law regarding unincorporated treaty
obligations, and (b) a statutory provision in § 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires
that U.K. legislation be interpreted in a manner compatible with ECHR rights “so far as it is
possible to do so.” Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (U.K.) (I must thank Shaheed Fatima for
clarifying this point). Finally, the European Court of Justice has adopted a principle of consistent
interpretation of European Union (E.U.) law with international obligations of the E.U. See Case
C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., 1992 E.C.R. I-6019, ¶ 9;
Case C-308/06, Interanko 2008 E.C.R. I-4057, ¶ 51. See also generally Betlem & Nollkaemper,
supra note 6, and d’Aspremont, Domestic Judges as Architects, supra note 20, at 143–44 (on
consistent interpretation).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44.
95. Examples would include the United States (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)),
Canada (Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 1, ¶ 60 (Can.)), and South Africa (AZAPO, supra note
93, ¶ 26).
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would argue that the PCIJ did not “violate” the customary principle of
exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas in SS Lotus96 by finding
it not to have been proven as existing custom? Or that the ICJ did not
violate the principle of integrity of treaties in its Advisory Opinion on
Reservations to the Genocide Convention?97 State reaction to the court
judgments in those cases—in the former, the clear establishment of a
rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction;98 in the latter, acquiescence to
the new principle of universality99—either stopped the judicial
development of international law or brought it to fruition.
Much more crucially, drawing a dividing line between violation
and development is not only difficult in many instances, but also
overwhelmingly subjective, at least to the extent that no final and
authoritative decision-maker has been instituted or has expressed
herself. Domestic courts partake in the law-developing capacity of any
judicial institution, and their contribution to the development of
international law, even through its violation, is fundamental.100 This is
not only because international law vests in them—as State organs—the
capacity to make new law or develop the law through their practice; it is
also precisely because international law endows them with an
international judicial function and establishes them as the “natural” or
first-instance judges of international law. A number of examples will be
invoked to corroborate this point.
The first relates to the interpretation and application of
international treaty law, and finds a parallel in the cases mentioned
earlier on the interpretation of domestic acts implementing Security
Council Resolutions.101 In a case relating to the application of the 1992
Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 International Oil Pollution
Compensation (IOPC) Fund Convention,102 the Greek Supreme Court103
96. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 27.
97. See Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 64; see also Alain Pellet,
Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 405, 411 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
98. See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal
Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation art. 1, May 10, 1952, 439
U.N.T.S. 233; Convention on the High Seas art. 11, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
11.
99. As finally evident in the provisions on reservations of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19–23, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
100. Conforti, supra note 93, at 6–7.
101. See supra notes 90–93.
102. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.9/15;
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
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interpreted the term “ship” in the Conventions clearly contrary to the
interpretation of the term that was agreed by the States-parties
constituted as the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC Fund.104 What is more,
the Assembly had noted that its interpretations should be considered as
subsequent agreement within the meaning of 31(3)(a) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and was thus binding, also for the
courts of States-parties.105 Yet in light of the jurisprudence of the Greek
Supreme Court, and in light of the new conditions that were brought to
the forefront, inter alia, by that case-law with respect to recent changes
in international maritime trade,106 the Assembly is reconsidering its own
definition of “ship” in the Conventions, with a view to bringing it up-todate. This process was still under way in 2012, but the case exemplifies
both the potential for international law-development of domestic courts,
and the difficulty in clearly qualifying a domestic court decision as
being in violation of international law.
Another aspect in which the contribution of domestic courts can be
seen as crucial is the elaboration of normative hierarchy in international
law. In a number of cases before domestic (and regional international,
which in the instance will be assimilated to domestic) courts,
individuals targeted by the 1267 sanctions regime of the Security
Council sought to attack the Council measures by attacking their
domestic implementing acts on the basis of both international and
domestic law, primarily on the basis of the internationally and
constitutionally protected right to a fair trial.107 When domestic courts
finally upheld their claims and struck down the domestic implementing
measures, forcing their States to disobey the Security Council
Resolutions, they did so by relying on domestic constitutional
provisions safeguarding the right to a fair trial. While this has been
criticized as dualism, a closer consideration of the relevant cases

Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27,
1992, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.9/16.
103. Marine Environmental Services M.C. and Environmental Protection Technical S.A. v.
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, Final Appeal Judgment in Cassation, No.
23/2006, 6 July 2006, ILDC 586 (GR 2006).
104. See Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Record of Decisions of the Eighth Session
of the Executive Committee, § 4.3, Doc. 92FUND/EXC.8/8, (2000).
105. See Int’l Oil Pollution Comp. Fund 1992 [IOPCF], Resolution No. 8 on the
Interpretation and Application of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund
Convention, IOPCF Doc. 92FUND/AC.1/A/ES.7/7—Annex (May 9, 2003).
106. See Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Application of the 1992 Conventions to
Ship-to-Ship Oil Transfer Operations and Floating Storage, Doc. IOPC/OCT10/4/3/1 (2010).
107. See Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court Reactions, supra note 35, at 58.
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(among them prominently Kadi,108 and the U.K. Supreme Court’s
Ahmed109) reveals that domestic courts relied on domestic law precisely
to avoid the overriding effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter (UNC),
which in the instance would be to obliterate the right to a fair trial.
While the decisions in both cases were made on domestic law grounds,
the constitutional or fundamental right sought to be protected, namely
that to a fair trial, is deeply internationalized, having found expression
both in widely ratified international treaties, and in customary
international law. In substance then, domestic courts in these cases can
be seen as preferring one international norm over another. In fact, this
reaction of domestic courts has been forcing the Security Council to
reconsider the remedies available to individuals sanctioned under the
1267 regime.110 Domestic courts could then be seen either as clarifying
the interpretation of Article 103 UNC to the effect that it cannot
override, for example, customary law or certain human rights, even if
these are not considered jus cogens, or as establishing certain rights (in
particular the right to a fair trial) as jus cogens.111
Conversely, it can be argued that the rather consistent approach of
domestic courts on the matter of the effects of jus cogens norms on the
rule of immunity has served to confirm that no change or new
understanding of normative hierarchy has taken hold as a matter of
general international law.112 In this situation it is clear that, despite the
occasional dissenting domestic decision (on which see the immediately
following paragraph), State practice through domestic court decisions
confirms that jus cogens norms do not have the effect of superseding the

108. Joint Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the
European Union, Comm’n of the European Communities, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
109. Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2.
110. See S.C. Res. 1904, Preamble & ¶ 20, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1904 (Dec. 17,
2009).
111. See generally Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in
HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (Erika de Wet & Jure
Vidmar eds., 2012). There could be even a third interpretation of domestic court practice, in that
they are actually establishing certain human rights as hierarchically superior to UN Security
Council decisions, even if the rights at stake do not constitute rules of jus cogens. For a similar
argument to the effect that between jus cogens and jus dispositivum there exist intermediate
hierarchical levels, on the basis of the importance of the relevant norms, which is positively
acknowledged through an extension of the circle of States who have standing to invoke
responsibility for their violation, see LINOS-ALEXANDER SICILIANOS, THE HUMAN DIMENSION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 366–67 (2010) [in Greek], and compare generally Linos-Alexander
Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of
International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1127 (2002).
112. See generally ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 65, at 552–54.
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rule of immunity. That international courts will take this into
consideration when faced with a similar question is evident in the ICJ’s
discussion of domestic court decisions in Arrest Warrant.113 At the same
time, it remains open to domestic courts to start consistently
acknowledging an exception to immunity for violations of jus cogens,
thereby developing the principles of normative hierarchy in
international law.114
Still on the issue of immunity, a further example is provided by the
dispute between Germany and Italy with respect to sovereign
immunity.115 The origins of the dispute lie in a series of decisions of
Greek116 and Italian courts117 denying the sovereign immunity of
Germany for gross violations of international humanitarian law during
World War II. In this case, the availability of an international instance
has led to the submission of the dispute created by the Italian domestic
court decisions to the ICJ. There is no doubt that the ICJ decision in this
case may have the effect of halting the development by its offering of an
interpretation of the law contrary to that proffered by the Italian courts.
This only demonstrates further, however, that domestic courts have a
clear and important role in the law-development aspect of an
international judicial function, even if only as a cog in the machinery of
judicial development of international law.
V. AN INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE
What then is the position of domestic courts in the international
legal order and in the international judicial function? What is it that
holds their dispute-settlement and law-development functions together?
With respect to both aspects, they have an important role: settling
disputes and enforcing international law—or creating disputes (or
rather, allowing them to “mature”) and prompting enforcement of the
law on the international plane; and interpreting and developing
international law—or violating it, depending on the reaction of States on
the international plane. The common question is who decides whether
the domestic court is fulfilling each aspect of its international judicial
113. Arrest Warrant, supra note 87, ¶ 58.
114. Cf. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 65, at 555–56 (arguing, however, that this will merely
be an acknowledgment of the correct position under international law rather than development).
115. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, ¶¶ 14, 86 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
116. Germany v. Prefecture of Voiotia, Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000, May
4, 2000, ILDC 287 (GR 2000), ¶ 8 (Greece).
117. Ferrini v. Germany, Corte Costituzionale [Constitutional Court], Mar. 11, 2004, ILDC
19 (IT 2004), ¶ 12 (It.).
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function or violating the law. And the answer to this question
demonstrates how the international judicial function of domestic courts
is integrated in the general international judicial function. Just as
domestic courts are a cog in the machinery of judicial development, so
are they a cog in the machinery of dispute-settlement and enforcement:
their decisions will either resolve disputes, thus enforcing, but also
interpreting and thus developing international law (if States acquiesce to
their decisions, or if these are confirmed by an international supervisory
instance—an international court); or they will instigate protest and
reaction, thus either forcing a dispute to mature—and eventually to be
resolved, or forcing the principal actors—States—to change (read:
develop) the law.
Domestic courts are thus part of an integrated architecture of the
international judicial function, established as the “natural” or
“immediate” judges of international law, and subjected to the
supervision of international judicial institutions—and in the final
analysis, States themselves.
If international law establishes domestic courts as the “natural”
judges of international law in an integrated architecture with
international courts and the decentralized action of States, then perhaps
this is cause for alarm. If we heed Lord Bingham’s warning, it is far
preferable that disputes between States be resolved by negotiation,
compromise, or if need be by decision of an international tribunal.
Domestic courts may not be experienced in international law matters.
They may give the appearance of partiality if their own State is
implicated, as is to be expected, and they may not permit adequate
representation of other States with an interest in the question.118 Lord
Bingham was undoubtedly right in expressing these reservations, which
are shared by others as well. One might add that domestic courts,
despite their best efforts (e.g., through consistent interpretation), may in
the end feel compelled to disregard international law in favor of the
contrary law of the State, despite any demands that international law
makes on them as the “natural” judges of international law.
However, a number of points serve to ameliorate any cause for
alarm. First of all, any domestic court decision that exercised the
domestic court’s international judicial function can be overruled by the
agreement of States. This agreement may also be expressed in their
institution of an international court to finally resolve an international
dispute: the international court is instituted as the supervisory
118. See Lord Bingham, International Law in National Courts, supra note 34, at 1.
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mechanism over domestic courts’ exercise of their international judicial
function.119 The ICJ proceedings between Germany and Italy again
serve as a case in point, as do, among others, the proceedings between
Belgium and Switzerland on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,120 the Certain Property
case,121 the ELSI case,122 the Barcelona Traction case,123 and the
Guardianship of Infants case.124 State reactions to the SS Lotus judgment
of the PCIJ,125 or to the South West Africa judgment of the ICJ,126
remind us further that even international courts are supervised, this time
by States in a decentralized manner. State agreement can overrule the
exercise of the international judicial function even by the “principal
judicial organ of the United Nations.”127
Second, domestic courts only rarely get to exercise their
international judicial function with respect to pure State-to-State
disputes. Far more often they will have to deal with international
disputes (i.e., disputes implicating international law), which are not
between States, but rather between other “users” of international law
(and States).128 While these disputes may evolve or “mature” into Stateto-State disputes (viz., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, as well as
Barcelona Traction) they will not be presented as such before the
domestic court. This is because of the augmenting international
regulation through the adoption of “inward-looking” norms, which
require implementation within the domestic jurisdiction and thus bring
domestic courts to the forefront of the international judicial function.
119. See Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12 (already recognizing this control in
1929).
120. Press Release, Int’l Ct. of Just., Belgium Initiates Proceedings Against Switzerland
(Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/145/15765.pdf. The case was
removed from the list at the request of Belgium. See Press Release, ICJ, Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Apr. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/145/16456.pdf.
121. Certain Property (Liech. v. Ger.), 2005 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 10).
122. ELSI, supra note 69.
123. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., Second Phase (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
124. Application of Convention of 1902 Governing Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.),
1958 I.C.J. 55 (Nov. 28).
125. See supra note 98.
126. South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18). For the reactions,
see generally JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE: DOCUMENTS AND
SCHOLARLY WRITINGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS, especially 332 et seq. and 374 et seq. (1973).
127. U.N. Charter art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1.
128. For the term “users” with respect to the beneficiaries of international norms, see
Emmanuel Roucounas, Facteurs privés et droit international public, 299 RdC 9 (2002) (Fr.).
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Third, and most importantly, it is true and it has been highlighted
throughout this article, that domestic courts can be seen as violating
international law as much as they can be seen as enforcing or
developing it when discharging an international judicial function. For
example, much criticism has targeted the ECJ’s decision in Kadi. One
of its most notable critics was indeed the General Court of the European
Union (GCEU) in Kadi II,129 even if the GCEU’s criticism was implicit
and even if the General Court did finally follow the ECJ. Like the U.K.
Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed, Kadi was seen as demonstrating a
regression by adopting a sharp distinction between the “domestic” and
the international legal order, akin to that adopted by U.S. courts for
example in Sanchez-Llamas,130 and Medellín.131 Both sets of cases rely
on domestic norms of constitutional rank to defeat international
obligations.
A distinction can be drawn, however, on the basis of an argument
relating to “deeply internationalized” constitutional norms. The
domestic provisions relied on by the ECJ and the U.K. Supreme Court,
which safeguard the right to a fair trial in its various aspects (access to a
court, access to an effective remedy, right to be heard), are mirrored in
substance in international law, which guarantees these aspects of the
right to a fair trial (e.g., in Article 14 of the International Convention of
Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, and also in customary international law).132 Much like
the District Court of Jerusalem argued in Eichmann that Eichmann’s
crimes were not solely crimes under Israeli law,133 the Canadian Federal

129. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. C 317/52, ¶¶ 113–21.
130. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
131. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
132. See, e.g., A v. B, Case 0345/99, Portuguese Constitutional Court, June 15, 1999, ILDC
1529 (PT 1999) (establishing the parallels between Articles 6 ECHR, 14 ICCPR, and 10 UDHR,
and Article 20(4) of the Portuguese Constitution (at H2)). See also the position of the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) with respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Christian Tomuschat notes that the HRC has adopted the “substantive criterion” of
ICCPR effectiveness within a domestic legal order, rather than rely on formal considerations of
whether the Covenant is incorporated into domestic law or is directly evocable before domestic
courts. TOMUSCHAT, supra note 24, at 117–20. Arguably, the HRC has even opined that
protection afforded on the basis of a domestic instrument of constitutional rank is even more
effective than protection on the basis of the Covenant itself. Finally, as Bruno Simma et al. have
argued, there is a paucity of references to international human rights norms in German
jurisprudence, precisely because of the overlap between internationally protected rights and those
guaranteed by the fundamental rights provisions of the Basic Law. Simma et al., supra note 93, at
75
133. CrimC (Jer.) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, (1961) (Isr.),
reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 18, ¶ 12.
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Court claimed, in upholding the constitutional rights of a Canadian
citizen subject to the 1267 regime, that these rights were not just rights
under the relevant Canadian Charter, but also under international law.134
This claim is in sharp contrast to the U.S. courts’ defense of a domestic
procedural provision (the procedural default rule); or to the move in
Oklahoma to amend the State Constitution in order to prohibit state
courts from “considering international law or Sharia law” or indeed “the
legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” without explaining why
such a move was necessary.135
As argued from the outset, the two basic and inseparable aspects of
the international judicial function of domestic courts are that of dispute
settlement/law enforcement and that of law-development. Jennings calls
the court judgment, even of a domestic court, the “acid test” of
enforcement, as it is in this form that the international obligation
appears “not as a proposition of general law, but is applied to particular
parties in the circumstances of a particular case.”136 Shany finds that the
core function associated with the international judicial role is “the
settlement of disputes by an independent and impartial body of judges
through a legal procedure resulting in the application of international
legal standards.”137 That is precisely what the decisions of domestic
courts above (the ECJ and the U.K. Supreme Court) resulted in, even if
they did not explicitly rely on international law. Their pronouncements
were definitely judicial pronouncements “of one kind or another,” and
they “resulted in” the application of standards that exist in the
international legal order.
Whatever arguments can be proffered to demonstrate that, in this
last example—but also in general—domestic courts implement and
develop, rather than violate, international law, can be more or less
persuasive, but in the end they are a matter of speculation or
construction. What counts (and what remains to be seen in the
aforementioned example) is what the reaction of States will be: in the
final analysis, they have the power to stop these developments in their
tracks by invoking the responsibility of those States with recalcitrant

134. Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Attorney Gen. of Canada, [2009] F.C. 580
(Can.).
135. See Julian Ku, Oklahoma’s Unnecessary Law to Ban Citation of Sharia Law and
International Law, OPINIO JURIS (June 15, 2010, 8:42 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/15/
oklahomas-unnecessary-law-to-ban-reliance-on-sharia-and-foreign-law/.
136. Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 3.
137. Shany, Jurisdictional Implications, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added).
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courts. Yet, if they acquiesce, the decisions of these courts will stand
and produce effects on the international plane.
As Fitzmaurice stated in Barcelona Traction, “judicial
pronouncements of one kind or another constitute the principal method
by which the law can find some concrete measure of clarification and
development.”138 It is conceded that he was talking about the value of
obiter dicta by an international court, while domestic court decisions are
mere facts from the perspective of international law. But, to put it as
succinctly as Nollkaemper, “a court is a court;”139 and, as courts,
domestic courts seem to be aware of their position and their power as
far as the interpretation and development of law is concerned. Their
adoption of a strong presumption of conformity and the concomitant
principle of consistent interpretation furnishes them with a very elegant
method in which to take up their position in the integrated architecture
of an international judicial function and fulfill their role as the natural
judges of international law. Claims at the international level become
subsidiary, if they are available at all. This means that the international
law question can effectively be raised and answered at the domestic
level. When the outcome is deemed unsatisfactory, international
procedures will be called upon to review the “facts” (including potential
decisions of the domestic court) and determine whether a breach of an
international obligation has taken place or whether the law has moved
on. The process then at the international stage is merely subsidiary or
supervisory; intervention will be limited to when the domestic process
fails to address the issues appropriately and conform to the international
obligation.140
The blurring of the dividing lines between international and
national norms has also blurred the dividing lines between international
and national dispute settlement. This has led domestic courts to assume,
even if by necessity, an international judicial function as part of their
judicial function to decide disputes and thus enforce, but also develop,
the law. Their international judicial function is assigned to them, or at
least it is acknowledged, by international law with respect to both of its
aspects. The blurring of the distinction between violation and
enforcement, and between violation and development, which is in part
due to the decentralized nature of the international legal order,
138. Barcelona Traction, supra note 123, ¶ 2 (separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice) (Feb. 5).
139. André Nollkaemper, The Role of Domestic Courts in the Case Law of the International
Court of Justice, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 301, 308 (2006).
140. Cf. Shany, Jurisdictional Implications, supra note 18, 20–21.
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highlights the international judicial function of domestic courts,
supervised in casu by their international counterparts, or—in the final
analysis—by States. It shows domestic courts as an important cog in the
machinery of dispute resolution and law-development, as the first—
”natural”—judge in the integrated architecture of an international
judicial function.

